CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL of the PACIFIC LIBRARY

The Modern Churchman.

No. 2. MAY, 1917. Vol. VII.

SOME DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE CHURCH.*

By the Rev. Professor F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D.

Professor Lake has pointed out in his *Stewardship of Faith* that the chief characteristic of primitive Christianity was its receptivity. So far from taking the teaching of the Founder literally, or regarding the Sermon on the Mount as a final revelation, even in ethics, the first Christians were ready by experience or, as one might say, by the guidance of the Spirit, to learn the true significance of the work of Jesus. Luke utters a profound truth when he describes his gospel as a record of what "Jesus began to do and to teach;" and the Acts is a history of an attempt to adapt the new Faith to altered circumstances. Thus the crude commission of the Church of Jerusalem was abandoned for a scheme of life compatible with actual conditions; the rigid exclusiveness of the first Jewish Christian community was replaced by a liberal and enlightened policy towards Hellenists, proselytes and, finally, Gentiles; and the belief in an immediate *parousia*, which the recorded words of Jesus had led his followers to expect, without ever being formally abandoned, was replaced by a realization of the constant presence of the Spirit of Christ as the guide of the Church.

To say that St. Paul recreated Christianity is to declare but a half truth; but undoubtedly the Apostle reinterpreted the work of Jesus, and directed it into a new channel. His refusal to know "Christ after the flesh" any more, had the result of making men regard the Lord less as a Teacher, whose

*Being the substance of The Inaugural Address delivered at the Union Theological Seminary, New York, on Sept. 28th, 1916.

words and acts were to be accepted literally and as the sole guide of life, than as the divine Head and Ruler of the Church, whose spirit energized the whole community. The Fourth Gospel, which has been aptly called "a commentary on the gospel narrative" without the text, "consummated the work of Paul by revealing Jesus as the incarnate Word, existing from all eternity as the creative and governing Power in the Universe;" and thus, as time went on, the Church fulfilled the prophecy that she should "suck of the riches of the Gentiles."

It is now a recognised fact that much, which used to be declared distinctively Christian, owes its origin to external sources. Stoicism supplied much of Christian ethics; Platonism contributed to theology; the mystery religions to sacramental thought. Without these elements the primitive faith might have perished with the early sects of Judaism, or have died with the unfulfilled hopes of an abortive eschatology. As it was the Church became a living organism absorbing all that contributed to nourishment, and as the struggle with Gnosticism shows, rejecting what might have poisoned its life or retarded its development.

The great progress of the Church of the first age is a testimony to the vitality of the *Ecclesia Discens*—the Church ready to learn.

The second stage may be conveniently marked by the conversion of Constantine, a symptom that the old Roman Empire was sick unto death, and was seeking in desperation for a new remedy to restore its energy. The Church was summoned to heal the wounds of the stricken empire, and responded to the call. Under these circumstances it had to assume the post of a teacher rather than a learner. Every teacher knows, that though *while* he teaches he must be always a learner, *when* he teaches he must speak with authority, and state the results of his learning with concise precision. The Church was no exception: whilst learning by experience, it had to declare its mind with no uncertain voice; and for good and

ill, dogma became inevitable. This explains those wearisome controversies with Arianism, Apollinarianism, Macedonianism, and like heresies, and the interminable disputes about the two-fold nature of Christ as God and Man. For this reason, creed succeeded creed, till the majority were satisfied by revised formulae of belief, like those of Constantinople (A.D. 381) or Chalcedon (A.D. 451). This explains the appearance of such documents as the *Tome*, the *Henoticon*, the *Three Chapters*, the *Ecthesis*, the *Type*, by which the rulers in Church and State strove to pacify parties contending about what are to us uncomprehensible points of dogma. From A.D. 318, the out-break of the Arian controversy, for about four centuries, till the Emperor Leo issued his image-breaking decrees, the work of the Church was to produce a well thought out scheme of Christian dogma; and this was done so thoroughly that it stood the test of centuries, and weathered even the storm of the Protestant Reformation. This period may therefore fitly be described as that of the *Ecclesia Docens*—the Church as a teacher.

On Christmas Day, A.D. 800, the Church was once more called upon to regenerate the world. The Empire, having become in Italy the shadow of a shade, had been obliterated in the middle of the Eighth Century by the Lombard Kings and Dukes. But a mightier power had arisen in that of the Franks, which after reaching its culmination under their monarch, Charles the Great, was summoned by the Popes, first to save them from the Lombards and, in the second instance, to deliver them from the violence of their own Romans.

The re-establishment of the Empire in the West witnessed the beginning of the temporal power of the Popes, and the rise of those princely bishoprics which were so marked a feature of mediaeval life. It also coincided with the opening of those differences which ultimately led to the complete separation of the ecclesiastical politics of the East and West. It is the latter with which we must concern ourselves here. Amid

many vicissitudes of fortune the power and wealth of the Church grew and increased, till its province soon included almost all human activities. The distinction between sacred and profane almost disappeared, as the Church monopolized the world. Education became the sole possession of the clergy, who doled it out in their own interests. Church courts overshadowed the lay tribunals. In wealth no king or prince could compete with the clerical order. The Roman Church claimed, as it still continues to do, an authority which no secular power is justified in disputing. So absolute was the domination of the religious ideal that the divine authority of the Emperor was set over against the divine authority of the Pope—it being beyond dispute that there was really no distinction between Church and State, since both drew their power from God—and almost every attack on the power of the mediaeval Church ended by demonstrating the immense strength of the fabric. For centuries we may without impropriety speak of the Church as the *Ecclesia Regnans*—the Church as a ruler.

Slowly indeed did those forces which ultimately overthrew the fortress of Church supremacy in Western Europe gather strength. At last the storm of the Reformation burst upon it and proved that its foundations were undermined. Apparently overwhelmed by the first onslaught, the Roman Church rallied her energies and rolled back the advancing armies of her foes. The great Catholic revival re-conquered many positions, and even territories before it spent its strength, after which the two great rivals, the united Catholic Church and the Protestants, united only by their common enmity to its claims, stood face to face, entrenched in lines, which neither the one nor the other was able effectually to break. For, since the middle of the 17th century, the boundaries between Protestant and Catholic Europe have scarcely changed. Yet, even in this distracted condition, the claims of the Church, whether Protestant or Catholic, continued to be the same; and the theory that society

was a religious organization remained unaltered. On one point at least we should have found a papal nuncio, an English bishop, a Scotch moderator, and a New England minister in complete agreement, namely that the first duty of the secular magistrate was to maintain the true worship of God, and to keep the faith unimpaired. The agreement characterized the age of what I shall term the *Ecclesia Divisa*—the Church divided into Churches.

The English Revolution of 1688 ushered in a new epoch fraught with far-reaching consequences, so far as the Church was concerned. In place of the mediaeval theory that the government of every Christian state is a divinely instituted means of fostering the Church, we have the view that governments are called into being for the benefit of peoples. From this time religion tended to become rather a personal matter than an affair of state; for this is the real meaning of toleration.

As long as the ruler of a state believes that he holds his office from God and not from man, that is to say, that he is responsible, as His vice-gerent, to God only, he cannot logically allow his people to choose how they will worship. The religion, on which the magistrate's claims rest, must be that of the state; and it is his first duty to maintain it. The Revolution of 1688 completely shattered the theory of Divine right, and, with it, of the duty of the monarch to be intolerant. It made the king responsible rather to his Parliament than to his God, and admitted, albeit grudgingly, the right of every Protestant to practise his religion as he pleased. The theory that toleration was wrong was virtually killed by the English revolution, but even in England it died slowly, and in many parts of the civilized world it retained an impaired vitality down to our own times.

The characteristic of this period was the rise of individualism in religion, and, what are known as the Methodist and Evangelical revivals in England, were symptomatic of the

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC

change. Originating in the mystical pietism of Germany, their strength lay in an appeal to each individual to save his own soul.

The bitterness with which John Wesley, an orthodox clergyman and a revivalist preacher, was attacked, alike by the clergy of the established church and by the Calvinist party, proves that both agreed in considering him a dangerous innovator; and explains how it was that utterances, which seem to our generation mere platitudes, met with such furious opposition in his own. The main difference between a Churchman and a Dissenter of the 18th century was, that the one had succeeded, and the other failed, in making his religion the official creed of England. Wesley's appeal to every man, regardless of sect, to find peace with God for himself, was heresy in the eyes of both. It was the same with the later Evangelical party in the Church of England, who were treated with marked disfavour by the Bishops early in the 19th century. Both they and the Methodists, practically, if not in so many words, maintained that each man had the right to find salvation in whatever way seemed best to himself, and that neither State nor Church had authority to interfere with this new form of Christian liberty.

But the most remarkable expression of this idea is found in a purely secular document—the Declaration of American Independence. Here we have one of the most significant events of human history, the rise of a new nation declaring the principle, not of toleration,—for that means allowing a minority to practice its religion unmolested,—but of complete religious liberty, any form of belief, not absolutely injurious to the health of the body politic, being respected by the Government. Naturally, therefore, religious independence became more marked in the United States than elsewhere.

The triumph of individualism in religion was complete. It overcame the very persons who opposed it most strenuously. The Oxford movement, for example, was an attempt to oppose

the growing liberalism of the fourth decade of the 19th century by exalting the power and authority of the Church. Its result was completely to undermine it. Newman, the leader of those who joined the Roman communion, sowed the seeds of Modernism. The English ritualists, who exalted the importance of the Episcopate to the skies, have made the worship of the Anglican Church pre-eminently congregational.

It is due to the fact that Christianity is now individual rather than corporate that everywhere the churches have failed to speak with authority in great crises of human history—and never more conspicuously than in the present war; that religion is a personal matter has become a truism, and one may truly define the churches of the nineteenth century as *Ecclesia Privatorum*—the Church composed of individuals.

But the disappearance of Church authority did not really shake the fabric of Christian dogma, erected in our second period—that of the *Ecclesia Docens*. Things remained as they had been, when the Protestants declared to the Catholics at the French conference at Passy that they were as orthodox as the defenders of the ancient religion. Even those who neglected the creedal formulae taught in accordance with them. It is impossible, for example, to preach the popular doctrine of the atonement and not to admit the truth of the Nicene Creed that Jesus Christ is God of God, and, of one substance with the Father. The sacramental theories, so popular with certain Anglicans, and even Presbyterians, depend on the definition of the Two Natures in Christ laid down in the Athanasian Creed, as Hooker long ago noticed in his *Fifth Book of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. It says much for the permanence of the work of the Church Fathers of the days of the Councils, that it remained unshaken by the divisions caused by the Reformation, and even by the dissolution of all Church authority, when the principles of individualism were generally accepted.

We have outlived the day of individualism, and also that of orthodoxy. The appeal to each one of us to save our own souls is still made, and often responded to, but it fails to touch the heart of many a thinking man and woman. To such this invitation has at times a selfish ring about it; and, if we make it, they are disposed to ask us, "Why should I be anxious to escape myself? I prefer the path of duty to your way of salvation. Tell me how I may help, not myself, but others. How I may do my part in redressing the evils of the world. I have, I confess, little sympathy with Bunyan's hero who left his wife and family, his friends and fellow citizens in the City of Destruction that he himself might enter the Golden Gates. I had rather perish than thus abandon them." Can we claim such sentiments. Precious as is each human soul, may it not be better developed in the open field than by the intensive culture of individualism. Without denying for a moment the value of personal religion, I can conceive of something nobler in unselfish devotion to the human race; nor do I believe one could be happy in heaven, if one got there by leaving all one loved on earth in the lurch. It is for this reason that individualism in religion is being rejected, and another ideal set up in its place; namely, what is really the essence of the old theory of the Church, that man does not live or die to himself, but as a member of a great family.

I believe few of us realize how completely the old orthodoxy fails to appeal to the modern Christian. Since the appearance of German criticism, and of such comparatively innocuous expositions of it as *Essays and Reviews,* and Bishop Colenso's attack on the facts of Pentateuchal narrative, we have passed through two phases. First, came a burst of indignation; the clergy rallied around the old beliefs, and declared the new views subversive of them. They fought Huxley and the scientists, and Kuenen, Wellhausen, and the Old Testament criticism; and boldly said that, unless the position of these innovators were demolished, the old beliefs of the Church were

not tenable. In this contest, if they showed little skill, they displayed at least enough logical perception to indicate that they realized the issues at stake.

In the end the Churches surrendered their positions, though scarcely comprehending that they had done so. They denied that so much had been at stake as men had supposed; and affirmed that, whilst some obsolete outworks had been abandoned, the fortress of the Faith remained unshaken. We, for I speak of my own generation and of myself, endeavoured to conceal our retreat in clouds of pious generalities.

But at the present time many of us are compelled to realize our mistake; for we find men of to-day have even departed more than they themselves are aware, from the orthodoxy of their fathers; and if they still rally round their symbols of faith, and profess their readiness to die under them, yet they are unable to receive them in the same sense as their immediate predecessors. Such, then, is the position of affairs to-day; and, in order to provide for the future, and to find a remedy, we have to look it unflinchingly in the face, and persuade others to do the same. We have to realize that the extreme peril to all that is worth having in Christianity is, that the majority of those who support our Churches refuse to do this, and that, till they abandon this position, the prospect is excessively gloomy.

The worst symptom of the disease appears to me to be in the undoubted fact that the Churches are less and less disposed to regard learning as among the most important qualifications of a minister; and are driving out of their pale those who are most determined to ascertain the truth. The professor, to whom theology is a science, is made to feel that he is not wanted by the Churches. In England, and I fear also in America, the clergy are becoming seminarists rather than scholars—that is men trained to support the peculiar tenets of a Church—and not to take broad views of great problems. Not so long ago the Churches gloried in producing great scholars; now they seem

content to encourage popular preachers and good administrators, and to leave those who think clearly and study hard outside their pale. Such a policy can have but one result—namely, to lose the rising generation, who are sure to realize, sooner or later, that organized Christianity has nothing to offer them, and can therefore be consigned to neglect and oblivion.

None of us can, however, fail to realize the importance of the Church and Christian Institutions to Christianity. I believe absolutely in their necessity; for I do not think our religion was ever intended to be, nor could it exist as a mere personal sentiment, an *animula*, *vagula*, *blandula*, a soul without a body, On the contrary it must have a corporate existence; and its members, to be healthy, must be parts of a living organism, whilst retaining each his several functions. The danger we have to combat in Christianity as now organized is the tendency to prune off those members whose vigour gives to the whole an appearance of individuality and beauty. We want the churches of the land to be like a fair forest, and not not an avenue of yew trees, clipped into rigid patterns and sterilizing the ground beneath them.

But to what ideal of the Church shall we turn?

In the old Latin versions the disciples are called *discentes*, and we must not disdain to be like the immediate followers of the Teacher. This is not to be attained by going backwards, as many a Church has attempted to do with an invariable lack of success, or by looking back, as most Churches are doing now, while the salt of the Dead Sea encrusts about them as if they were so many Lot's wives; but by advancing prepared to refuse the evil, however venerable and authoritative, and to choose the good, however novel it may seem; ready to learn, not only from the past but also from the present. It is for this end I believe we strive, this ideal that we hold before our eyes to make the Churches learned and learning bodies, each with its message of comfort to the world.

ECCLESIAE GUBERNATOR.

By Rev. J. C. Hardwick, B.A.

To me, one is worth ten thousand, if he be the best.—*Heraclitus.*

In the ecclesiastical world the conditions that prevail place a premium upon good leadership. The clergy are a difficult flock to guide. Conscientious and good-hearted, endued often with almost heroic virtues, they are yet liable to certain characteristic aberrations. They fly into sudden panics, are attacked by fits of unfairness and intolerance, and are even tempted to worship shibboleths and symbols instead of realities.

Corruptio optimi pessima. Religious fervour is perhaps only purchased at a certain cost, at a certain sacrifice of necessary qualities, such as prudence, tolerance, breadth of judgment, and veneration for truth. A clear-headed fanatic is a "strange centaur," and not often found. Sane enthusiasm is a rare gift. Too often the enthusiast is devoid of that sense of proportion, the possession of which (as Lord Morley says) constitutes one of the principal differences between a wise man and a fool.

It is the delicate and difficult task of the wise "father in God" to encourage and to pacify his restless following; he must strive to allay their fears and passions, their prejudices and suspicions, to enlighten their minds and enlarge their sympathies. He must play the part of a statesman in a country torn by the factions of hasty-handed and short-sighted politicians, or that of a great popular leader who can dominate and control the irrational passions of the mob by the weight of his acknowledged worth and character.

> "*Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta est*
> *Seditio, saevitque animis ignobile vulgus,*
> *Jamque faces et saxa volant—furor arma ministrat—*
> *Tum pietate gravem et meritis si forte virum quem*
> *Conspexere, silent arrectisque auribus adstant;*
> *Ille regit dictis animos, et pectora mulcet.*"

The period between 1842 and 1872, was with the exception of the present, the most dangerous and critical of recent

generations for the English Church. It was marked by intense religious excitement. Then, if at any time, the clergy needed the guidance of a wise episcopate, the moderating influence of ecclesiastical statesmanship and intellectual power.

There is nothing more tedious and jejune than the history of theological controversies. No doubt they have their interest for the student of the development of ideas, but to the plain man they are a weary wilderness, an abomination of desolation. And it is a singular testimonial to the qualities of Bishop Thirlwall's *Charges*,[1] issued as they were once every three years during this period of theological turmoil, that they should be at all readable to-day, when many of the problems with which they are concerned, have either met with a solution or have been transformed out of all recognition.

That a man of Thirlwall's intellectual stature should have deliberately produced anything of a merely ephemeral value, was perhaps out of the question. An encyclopaedic mind, such as was his, necessarily dignifies what it touches, and lifts even polemical theology into the sphere of serious literature. We must remember that Thirlwall was a brilliant classic, had a European reputation as an historian, was versed to a degree exceptional in his day in patristic and mediaeval learning, was familiar with the French, Italian, and German literatures, was a considerable student of law, and a competent jurist; uniting with all these accomplishments a lucid and nervous literary style and a practical knowledge of affairs. In consequence, his *Charges* constitute a contribution to English theology and ecclesiastical statesmanship which is of permanent value. They form a treasury of principles and precedents which may help to guide us to-day to a right decision of those problems with which the religious world is faced.

Permanent principles are of more service than temporary expedients. It has been, to some minds, not the least of the

[1] *Remains, Literary and Theological*, of Connop Thirlwall, edited by Canon Perowne, D.D. 3 vols. (*Charges* vols. 1 & 2). Doldy, Isbister & Co., 1877. 32/- net.

attractions of the Roman Church that a definite principle guides its authorities at all times and in every circumstance; not an enlightened principle, perhaps, but a consistent one. If other Churches are to compete successfully with that great institution, they must be not less true to themselves. If they stand for freedom, then to be consistent in the service and use of freedom; if for authority, then to offer a consistent submission. In these days there is no room for a Church of temporary expedients and half measures. The present leaders of the Church of England hardly seem to have grasped that truth.

Thirlwall, though it is perhaps doubtful if he saw where his principles would ultimately lead, stood for toleration, and was always consistent in the application of that principle. He regarded dogmatical intolerance as a hateful thing; such a spirit seemed to him "fraught with mischief and danger."

> "Things in themselves indifferent are made party badges and shibboleths, to which one side clings the more tenaciously because they are vehemently disliked by the other. Ambiguous terms and practices are studiously selected and brought prominently forward, because they wear an obnoxious meaning, while by others such a meaning is fastened on the most innocent usuages and expressions. The fullest and worst demonstration of this intolerant spirit is an eagerness for the making of new heresies, an endeavour to contract the terms of admission into the Church or its ministry, so as to exclude or disquiet all who do not belong to the favoured party."[1]

Thirlwall knew enough of clerical psychology to be aware that this spirit springs not (as is sometimes urged) from any veneration for religious truth *as such;* piety is not the soil from which such weeds spring. (Though the pietist has too often been the victim and tool of the dogmatist, who has exploited his innocent fervour).

Those truths of religion by which men live do not provide an adequate arena for controversy, or for an exclusive clerical policy:—

> "It is not large enough, and must be dilated by speculation on questions which lie outside of it."[2]

[1] *Charges*, vol. I., pp. 252-3. [2] *Ibid*, vol I., p. 262.

With this dislike of intolerance was united a veneration for truth, and a moral enthusiasm for justice.

> "I am against oppression and injustice, on whatever side they are found; but, as they are the natural allies of error, I deprecate them most of all when they are called in as auxiliaries to the side of truth."[1]

The authoritarians can never understand that it is the greater faith which holds that Truth "needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensings to make her victorious," and that it is the lesser faith which seeks to protect Truth by "shifts and defences."

Tolerance is not, as its opponents find it convenient to allege, the fruit of indifference, but of an informed mind, and an educated judgment. To see things, if not *sub specie aeternitatis*, yet with some knowledge of their historical antecedents is a good prophylactic against prejudice. It is only those with restricted ideas who are quite sure that nobody else is right. Hence Thirlwall was for combining education with tolerance. Tolerance for him did not mean easy and perhaps ignorant indifference, but enlightened breadth of view.

An example of this enlightened breadth of view is seen in his own attitude towards the Tractarian movement at its inception. Unlike the Evangelicals, he refused to condemn it as an illegitimate development of Anglican principles. His knowledge of history and of men made him aware that

> "At the bottom it is nothing more than a revival, or, as we may choose to call it, a continuation, of a controversy which is as old as the first establishment of our Church; it represents a contrast of opinions, views, and feelings which has never ceased to exist within her pale, though varying in its outward demonstrations according to the shifting phases of her historical development."[2]

He says in another passage of the same *Charge*,

> "If anyone is convinced that the Reformation has left nothing to desire, and that it has taken away nothing that we ought to regret, he may well be content with the pleasure of such a belief, without seeking to force it upon others as a duty."[3]

To an essentially judicial mind, exercising that calm outlook upon affairs which only a large culture and wide sympathies

[1] *Ibid*, vol I., p, 274. [2] *Ibid*, vol. I., p. 27. [3] *Ibid*, vol. I., p. 49.

can give, the zealous but ill-considered activities of loose-minded men are often a painful spectacle.

> "It may be that men and women of good-will are most admirable, but they are dangerous if they are ignorant. In political action knowledge is even more required now-a-days than good intentions . . . and no man can make up by good wishes for his ignorance of facts."[1]

This remark of a modern critic is as applicable in the narrower sphere of ecclesiastical affairs, as in that of national politics. Thirlwall saw in the zeal of ignorant Churchmen the chief menace to the Church. He did not fear the Radicals in Parliament so much as the bigoted Conservatives in his own camp. He speaks of

> "The misguided zeal of some of the Church's friends, from whom, I believe, she has at present more to fear than from the bitterest of her enemies."[2]

One is reminded of the warning that Pericles felt it necessary (how necessary after events proved) to administer to the Athenians:—

> "I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies' designs."[3]

Not but that Thirlwall (like Pericles) had his doubts about the docility of those he endeavoured to persuade. Dealing with the reform of Convocation and its endowment with inquisitorial and judicial powers, he writes (after speaking his mind somewhat freely):

> "I feel myself bound to speak out plainly on this subject, though I know that the warning, in proportion as it is needed, is the more likely to be neglected."[4]

Quos deus vult perdere prius dementat.

Thirlwall had singularly little patience with the devices of ecclesiastical rhetoricians. More than once he found it necessary to expose the poverty or falsity of meaning underlying those rhetorical appeals about "galling fetters" and "ignominious bondage" with which the clerical press sought

---

[1] Delisle Burns, *Political Ideals*, p. 290.

[2] Vol. II., p. 138. *c.f.* p. 305, "It is not Disestablishment or Disendowment, but Disruption, Disorganisation, and Disintegration, that we have immediately to dread."

[3] *Thucydides*, I., 144. [4] Vol. II., p. 140.

to discredit the Royal Supremacy, and to impress the world with the desolate spectacle of a Church enslaved by cynical politicians.

Thirlwall knew that the freedom these liberators had in mind, was the freedom to suppress other people, and to impose the views of a faction upon the Church at large. He was, indeed, not only averse to sentimental and rhetorical appeals, but to extravagant language of every kind; he knew that it did little but obscure the issue; passion he felt to be an opaque medium, and "to fasten an ugly name upon an opinion from which we dissent" is not to controvert it.

Perhaps Thirlwall's attitude towards the "Education question," best reveals the tenour of his mind. He being a man of some culture, not devoid of common sense, and well versed in the things of the mind, knew what education meant: that information is not education, and that religion is not a thing which can be taught like arithmetic, and be shut off in a water-tight compartment by allotting it a definite space upon the time-table.

> "I venture to think that the line commonly drawn between secular and religious instruction is too sharp and trenchant. I do not think that a School in which instruction is confined to secular subjects is therefore necessarily irreligious. I believe that it may be a school of morals as well as of learning, acting upon the habits and character, by discipline, precept, and example, and thus opening the way, and disposing the heart, for an intelligent reception of religious truth. I attach much greater importance to the tone, to the moral atmosphere of a school, than to the nature of things taught in it. I also believe that *enormous exaggeration prevails as to the capacity of children, especially of the poor, for the reception of theology.*"[1]

We have ventured to italicise the final sentence, for it seems to us to go to the bottom of the so-called "religious" difficulty. The remark is, of course, rank heresy for a Bishop, but that does not make it the less true. The "doctrinal" question is a piece of mythology invented for the use of platform rhetoricians. As Thirlwall himself says:—

[1] Vol. II., p. 255.

> "The so-called religious difficulty, which never existed outside the minds of persons whom it furnished with the only plausible basis for their argument, may continue to serve as a convenient topic for platform declamation."

It is, perhaps, not necessary to make further quotations from these *Charges* in order to make clear what spirit they are of. We can only lament that this spirit has not been more common in the policy of the Church since Thirlwall's time. It is a spirit from which alone the Church problems of the day, perhaps more clamorous and urgent than ever before, can expect solution. By this spirit they are lifted out of that level of petty bickering over details at which clerical disputants have been too often willing to remain, preferring "the illusions of names and phrases" to that judicial and patient wisdom which seeks *rerum cognoscere causas*, and whose standard, like Plato's, is not "opinion," but truth.*

THE ATONEMENT AND THE EUCHARIST.

By Rev. Leonard Patterson, M.A.

The two predominant parties in the English Church have each their cherished convictions and distinctive doctrines. The Atonement is the watchword of the Evangelicals: the Eucharist is the ensign of the Catholics. We, Modern Churchmen, desire to retain and express the truth which is found in both these fundamental doctrines.

No doubt many feel that there is a vital connexion between the Atonement and the Eucharist, but they have never clearly traced it out for themselves. My object is to try and do this very briefly and very simply.

* It is instructive to note the reticence of the present Minister of Education upon the "religious question." Is it too much to hope that we may at last write *REQUIESCAT* over that disturber of our peace? There would then be good hopes of educational progress —the *spes una salutis* of our distracted country.

First of all, it is necessary to clear the ground by removing popular misconceptions as to the nature and purpose of the Atonement. The essential purpose of Atonement is Reconciliation. That was the original meaning of the word, as it was used just before the time at which our authorized version of the Bible was made. We read in Shakespeare:—

> "He desires to make atonement
> Between the Duke of Gloster and your brothers."*

The Levitical means of reconciliation between God and man is sacrifice. Sacrifice is not punishment for sin nor substitution of an inoffensive victim for the offender. Such views of sacrifice are altogether opposed to the teaching of the prophets of Israel. A detailed discussion of the Jewish sacrifices and their interpretation is of course impossible here, but a brief examination of them will put the nature of sacrifice in a clearer light.

Sacrifice, with the Jew, was not a way of escaping punishment, but of giving the best to God. If an animal was offered, it was not punished for the sin of the offender. The aim of the sin-offering was not expiation, but the dedication of the life of the sinner. This object is expressed and confirmed by the ritual of sacrifice. The sprinkling of the blood was the offering of life to God, the refuse, which denoted the sin, was removed and burnt outside the camp.

Sacrifice, for the Jew, did not denote substitution. The animal offered was not the substitute, but the symbol of the worshipper. Of course the man could not actually offer his life without dying, but unless he offered himself in spirit to God, the material sacrifice was worthless.

The idea of substitution is erroneously derived from the offering of the scapegoat on the day of Atonement. The fact has been overlooked that two goats were provided. The sacrificed goat was the emblem of the nation devoting itself to God. The other, or scapegoat, had the sins of the nation placed upon its head, and was sent into the wilderness.

Richard III., Act 1, Scene 3.

The aim of sacrifice therefore was neither punishment nor ubstitution, but the renunciation and removal of sin, and the onsecration of the worshipper to God. The Jewish sacrifices oreshadowed the sacrifice of Christ, and if this interpretation of nem be correct, it should hold good with regard to His sacrifice. The ideas of punishment or substitution are, strictly speaking, napplicable to the sacrifice of Christ.

Christ was not punished for our sins. Transferred sin is mpossible, because sin is personal; imputed sin is unjust, ecause Christ was innocent. Vicarious punishment is grotesque, nd would probably be useless. Some may suggest the case f the whipping-boy, who was punished for the faults of his oyal master. But the attempt to apply this instance would nvolve us in utter absurdities. The thought of God punishing hrist for our sins is immoral. Evil men punished Christ; God id not. God's purpose in Christ was not punishment, either f Christ or mankind, but reconciliation.

"Christ," says St. Peter, "suffered once concerning sins, the ghteous on behalf of the unrighteous, that he might bring us o God" (1 Pet. iii. 18).

Again, Christ did not suffer as our substitute. He did not ie instead of us, but for our sakes. We too have to suffer or our sins, even when we repent of them, and we too have o die. The sufferings of Christ were not substitutionary, but xemplary.

As St. Peter writes: "Christ suffered on behalf of you, leaving ou an example, that ye should follow His steps" (1 Pet., ii. 21). [e set us a supreme example of self-sacrifice in obedience to ne Divine Will.

The idea of vicarious suffering is only true in so far as it neans suffering on behalf of another, but in any case vicarious uffering is not vicarious punishment.

But if Christ was not our substitute, at least He is our repre-ntative and our mediator, one through whom we all may be rought into a right relation with God.

To sum up, the death of Christ was an act of renunciation of sin, and an act of self-consecration to God. Now what is the relation of the Atonement to the Eucharist?

It is said by some that the Atonement is Christ's "finished work." But where His work ends, our work begins. The Atonement has been made once for all, but we must make it our own. We have to work out our own salvation, by identifying ourselves with the spirit of Christ's sacrifice. The Eucharist is the continuation of the work of the Atonement, because it is a means of reconciliation, or getting right with God. Here again we must guard against the same errors as were made about the Atonement.

First, there is the error of substitution. Just as some Evangelicals believe that Christ was offered as our substitute on the Cross, so Romanists believe that He is offered as our substitute on the altar. But Christ never was, nor is our substitute. He offered Himself on the Cross on our behalf, and we offer ourselves with Him at the Eucharist.

Secondly, there is the error about the nature of sacrifice. The Romanist says that the Mass is a true and proper sacrifice, and therefore it must be material. The Evangelical says that, if there is any sacrifice, it must be spiritual, and therefore the Eucharist is not a true and proper sacrifice. Each of them has got hold of half the truth. The Eucharist is a true and proper sacrifice, because the true sacrifice is spiritual, the offering of the will to God.

The Eucharist, then, is a continued memorial of the sacrifice on the Cross. Though the Lord's Supper was prior to the Crucifixion in time, it was intended to symbolise and represent that sacrifice. The breaking of the bread and the pouring out of the wine, represented the breaking of Christ's body and the shedding of His blood. But there is no material transformation of the elements. They are changed, not in their nature but in their use. They are, and remain, consecrated symbols of Christ's sacrifice. The priest, as the representative of the

people, offers the elements on their behalf as a symbol of their gratitude for Christ's sacrifice and of their participation in its spirit. Thus the congregation are not merely passive spectators, but active participators in the sacrifice. To quote St. Peter once again:—"Ye are a holy priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ" (1 Pet., ii. 5).

On the other hand, the minister of Christ gives Christ's body and blood to the people. The late Bishop Perowne[1] wrote of this giving of Christ's body:—

> "What Christ gave them at the Lord's Supper, He gives us now. He gave His Sacrifice on the Cross."

Christ gave us Himself in love. He gives us the spirit which prompted His sacrifice. He gives us, if we will, the strength to live as He lived, and so we are enabled to give ourselves through Him to our Father, and for our brethren.

In the words of our Prayer-book, "We offer and present unto Thee, O Lord, ourselves, our souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice unto Thee," an echo of the words of St. Paul, "I beseech you, brethren, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service." In this way we share in the sacrifice of Christ, and make it our own. As the elements are offered and consecrated, so we offer and consecrate ourselves to the service of God and our brethren. Therefore the sacrifice of ourselves, which we offer in the Eucharist, must be realized in our daily lives. Christ has given Himself for us, and to us, and we in the same spirit must give ourselves to God and for our fellow-men. We are members of His body, and if we want to have fellowship with Him and His Father, we must also have fellowship with one another. The means and end of the Atonement and the Eucharist are the same.

---

[1] *Some doctrines of the Church of England about the Lord's Supper.*

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

By the Rev. C. F. Russell, M.A., late Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge.

"A threefold cord is not quickly broken."—*Ecclesiastes iv.* 12.

If we study what is known about early races of men, or investigate the habits and mental ideas of savages in our own day, in either case we find that a great deal of the life of nature appeared to them, and still appears, as full of mystery. The wise man among us will say that they were right, for the whole of nature is mysterious; but that—true as it is—was not the impression produced upon those primitive people. For they accepted without surprise most of the ordinary natural processes with which every minute of their lives made them familiar, and reserved their wonder for events which, just because they were irregular in their occurrence, could not be predicted, or for those which, in spite of their regularity, were of a specially striking kind. Such were the facts connected with birth and death, the eclipse and the thunderstorm, the sunrise and the return of spring. Mysteries such as these were bound to influence their beliefs; and some of them came, in time, to be associated in a special way with the idea of God, and to be regarded as peculiarly appropriate to the Divine presence. Nor was this association confined to the early and more elementary systems of religious belief. We do not need to be reminded that, in our own Bible, thunder is the voice of God, and the lightnings are his arrows; and we know how the thought of the majesty and sacredness of the Mosaic law was implanted and fixed in the hearts of the Hebrew people by a traditional account of awful happenings at Sinai on the occasion of its first promulgation.

We say that this sort of thing was superstition, perhaps; but there was truth in it nevertheless. And if it was not the whole truth, the mistake was not that to connect the marvellous life of nature with God was in itself unlawful, but that the association was not made more widely. All nature is mysterious, as it has just been said, to those who have eyes to see; only—it is so familiar, and we do not stop to think. Otherwise we should see a mystery just as profound in the oak tree and the acorn, in the beetle and the blade of grass. All these things reveal God: that is to say, they tell us something about Him, tell us what, in certain respects, He is like. When St. Paul was preaching at Lystra, his words showed that he well knew how much of a true religious belief was possible for men who had nature as their only teacher.

> "God left not Himself without witness, in that He did good, and gave you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling your hearts with food and gladness."

Many of us have proved for ourselves this witness that nature bears. It may be that we have sometimes stood alone beneath the starry sky, and have gazed—and gazed—until we seemed to have a strange sympathy with those bright suns, and knew them for our friends. We have been soothed and refreshed, and inspired with awe and courage. As we have watched we have learnt to know better that power and order are in God. We have learnt, too, that His power and order must not be separated; that power, with Him, does not mean arbitrary interference, but the mighty working of One who eternally knows His own mind. God has no need to change either His plans or His purposes, as if the course of events had taken Him by surprise. So also other lessons have reached us at other times from mountain and lake and forest, from the flaming sunset, from the song of birds: we have learnt from them that in God is perfect beauty. Does anyone doubt that the sense of beauty has a religious value? that the love of beautiful things is one aspect of the love of God? These things—beauty, order, power—do not exhaust His character, but they are essential

to it, and when nature has revealed them to us, she has, in so doing, taught us to see Him. In them, He is brought near to us; in them, He can be known, and worshipped, and loved.

> "The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills and the plains,—
> Are not these, O soul, the Vision of Him who reigns?"

But our lives are not spent in the companionship of nature alone. They are lived among our fellow-men; and from them also, and from our relations with them, we may learn about God. Let us consider how this can be.

We know well how impossible it is for us to regard everyone, and everything that happens, with moral indifference. We cannot help appraising the characters of those we see or read about; we cannot help assigning praise or blame to this particular act or that general line of conduct. We judge, and balance, and estimate; and, unless our judgment is affected by self-interest and prejudice, it usually happens that in our inner-most thoughts we judge rightly, for "we needs must love the highest when we see it." We know that the man who industriously makes boots for most of his time has something more praiseworthy in his life than the man who lives simply to amuse himself; even though, being weak in will, we might perhaps choose the easier course for ourselves. We respect the doctor, toiling in the slums of a great city, more than the money-lender who lives by taking private advantage of other persons' difficulties. We revere a Lord Shaftesbury more than a Jack Johnson. We admire the man who fights and dies for his country more than the man who passes as much of his time as possible attending race meetings.

Now every time that we make these judgments, we are asserting, though it may be unconsciously, something about the character of God: we are asserting, for instance, that there is something God-like in energy, in unselfishness, in self-sacrifice. For is it not true that when once men's religion had reached the form of monotheism, when once they had learned to think of "God," or even of "a God among gods," rather than of

"gods" simply, from that time the name "God" began more and more to concentrate and embody for them all the highest that they knew? Is it not thus that the idea of God has grown and developed? The ancient prophet who, by long pondering on the evils of society, discovered fresh possibilities of goodness, or, by studying the history of his own race, learned to understand the moral character of what we call Providence, thereby enlarged the conception of God to which his fellow-countrymen had attained. And it is the same in our own day also: whenever we discover some new aspect of virtue in men, unthought of before, our idea of God, the supreme Goodness, is enriched; whenever we trace some new connexion between actions and their results in history, whether of nations or of individuals, our knowledge of His methods is extended.

There was a time in history when men found themselves face to face with One in Whom they saw all the goodness that they could conceive. For nineteen centuries their verdict has been continually re-affirmed, and their descendants have looked back to that figure to find there the only perfect human life that has ever been lived on the earth. It was a life in which each detail of thought and speech and action, bore witness to a heart impelled by strong self-less love. And with the vision of that life there entered into men's thoughts a conception of God which is still our inspiration to-day; they learned to say with St. John that God is Love.

Shall we not, then, agree that the Divine nature and character are made known to us in history as well as in nature? He that hath seen Jesus hath seen the Father.

There is a third way in which God reveals Himself: it is in the inner spiritual life of men, in the processes of their reason, in their efforts to understand and harmonise their many-sided experience. It was in this way also, and not only through nature and history, that He made Himself known to the ancient Jewish prophets; and when we speak of Divine inspiration it is this that we have most frequently in our minds. But inspiration

was no rare and exceptional thing. Just as Christ used to address His parables to audiences composed of individuals in very different stages of spiritual attainment and consequently with very different capacities for comprehending His deeper meaning, and used again and again to conclude His teaching with the challenge, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear," so to-day there are some to whom the Divine voice, speaking in the hidden recesses of the mind, is eagerly recognised and listened to, while others are deaf or dull or indifferent. But we sadly misunderstand the nature of that heavenly voice if we deny its reality in all circumstances but those which men call religious. It is true that it may speak consolation to the mourner, or may breathe new energy into the faith of one who is beset by religious despondency and doubt; but equally it may stir with high hope and endurance the searcher after scientific or philosophic truth, or may suggest the solution of some baffling problem in modern life. In each of these ways, and in many more, we may have a fresh vision of God, shedding light upon aspects of His character and methods of His working which not only we ourselves, but all mankind, had sought in vain to understand before.

This revelation of God through the working of human minds takes place not only within, but also outside, the Christian churches,—sometimes, indeed, in those who seem to have but little sympathy with the specifically religious aspect of life. None the less it is our duty to listen to them with the deepest attention and reverence when they would tell us that which, with all its novelty, they believe to be true. In politics, in science, in morals, their words and books may be to us the very voice Divine, for they may teach us to understand the Creator and His work more fully. It is to-day, as it has always been, one of the sad facts about many Christian people that they wholly and deliberately refuse to learn from any teacher unless he comes to them wearing the badge of their ecclesiastical organisation. Those who do so have stopped their ears against

much that God would say to them; for the attitude of our modern prophets towards the problems of life is often fundamentally religious, though it finds a different expression from that of the orthodox believer. Was there, perhaps, some thought of all this in the mind of Jesus when He spoke to the religious leaders of His day about "the sin against the Holy Ghost"?

We have seen that God is made known to men in nature, in history, in human reason. In nature, we learn to know Him as Power and Beauty; in history, we find that He is Justice and Love; in man's reason, we see Him as Wisdom and Truth.

Does it not strengthen the claim of religion upon our lives, does it not strengthen, too, the confidence with which we hold fast our faith, to know that the life of the outer world and the life of man and the life of thought all bear witness to Him? "A threefold cord is not quickly broken."

There is yet one more lesson that our subject has to teach us,—a lesson which, to some people, may seem the hardest of all, but one, nevertheless, which has a special appropriateness for our own age. Just because it is the same God who is thus diversely revealed, it follows that all knowledge must form a self-consistent and harmonious system. To believe the doctrine of the Trinity means, among other things, to believe that the study of nature which we call science, and the studies of man which we call history and sociology, and the study of thought which we call philosophy, cannot lead ultimately to contradictory results. They have different lessons to teach us, we may well believe; but they are friendly to one another, and they all contribute to the fulness of truth. It is not at all times easy to believe that devotion can be reconciled with scientific research, or religion with philosophy, or ethics with economics. But the man who believes that the God and Father of Jesus Christ is also the God of Nature and the God of Reason, cannot doubt it without self-contradiction. The

unity of knowledge, amid its diversity, follows necessarily from the unity and three-fold manifestation of God.

And so, once more, if we would learn as much as we can about the Divine nature, we must break down the barriers between sacred and profane, and seek for enlightenment from every possible source. It is told of a famous modern dramatist that once when the chairman of a meeting at which he was to speak was introducing him to his audience, he remarked that he had often wondered that Mr. So-and-So had never written a play about God. Mr. So-and-So objected to the suggestion. On the contrary, he said, all his plays were about God. Was his statement a shocking and profane one? Is there not a sense, and a very profound sense, in which it was incontestably true? We shall do well to get that sense into our minds, and to accustom ourselves to see in every serious study by any one of the problems which many-sided nature presents to us, an attempt to add something to the whole organised body of truth, and therefore also an attempt to discover some new thing that before was hidden about God's character and method and will.

The men who live around us to-day are widely different in tastes and habits, but to all of them the God of Christianity makes His appeal. Whether their interest is chiefly in the life of nature, or of man, or of intellect, each of these can support and strengthen their religious faith. Let us not think, then, that religion is concerned with only one part of our experience, for all life is sacred. In all of it, God is revealed; through all of it, He speaks; by all of it, He claims our worship.

"For so the whole round earth is every way
Bound by gold chains about the feet of God."

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

A REVIEW.*

By Principal F. B. Jevons, Litt. D.

The four volumes of *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, by Dr. Merz, have placed him in the first rank of living European philosophers. His *History* is a history not only of philosophy, but also of science in the nineteenth century; it appeals alike to the man of science and to the philosopher. Dr. Merz now follows it up with a philosophical essay, entitled *Religion and Science*, which in its 190 pages appeals to those who are neither philosophers nor men of science, but who by their education are not prepared to give up either science or religion, and yet are seriously disquieted by grave doubts, whether it is possible, for a man who thinks things out, to adhere to both.

In his *History of European Thought*, Dr. Merz expressed his conviction that the ultimate tribunal, to which science and philosophy alike must in the last resort appeal, is common sense. Dr. Merz therefore by submitting now to the ordinary educated reader the conclusions which he has reached, as to the relations of religion and science, is acting on the conviction to which he had already given expression in his *History*. Further, in his *Religion and Science* he acts on the principle or method on which, he tells us, he had found himself acting, at first unconsciously, in his *History*. In the European thought of the nineteenth century the dominating methods of investigation had consisted in analysis followed by synthesis, or attempts at synthesis; the assumption was that if we analysed a thing carefully, we could reconstruct it by putting together again, or synthetising, its elements. On this assumption, after analysing, say, protoplasm, we ought to be able to put together again its elements, and produce life. But we don't; the assumption does not work. The assumption that, because a thing can be analysed, therefore it must be a compound, does not work. It does not work out in practice, and therefore cannot furnish us with a correct theory of things for the purposes of philosophy. But during the nineteenth century another way of looking at things began to assert itself. Some things, it came to be seen, were best understood not by isolating them and considering them apart from their surroundings, but by viewing them in their surroundings; an organism can only be understood properly, if studied in its environment. To understand it properly, or rather to understand it at all, a *vue d' ensemble*, as Comte called it, a synoptic view, as Dr. Merz calls it, is essential. This principle applies not merely to an organism and its environment, but to the whole body of our experience; it is from the whole before us that we start, and it is for the purpose of returning with a better understanding to the whole that all speculation, scientific or philosophic, is undertaken. That is the principle which gradually became clear to Dr. Merz in the course of writing his *History*, and that is the method, the synoptic method, adopted by Dr. Merz as the

**Religion and Science: a Philosophical Essay*, by J. T. Merz. Blackwood & Son, London, 1915.

method and principle of his philosophy; he follows Plato, who long ago declared that he alone was a philosopher who could see things together, or comprehend them in a synoptic view.

The very principle then of a philosophy which seeks to see things in their "togetherness," that is to see them as a whole, is the principle which forbids exclusion, and insists on inclusion. The comprehensive view of the philosopher will include both religion and science; no view which excludes either can be a comprehensive view of the totality of things human and divine, or profess to be even an attempt to see things as a whole. The business of the philosopher is not to explain away either the sense experience on which science is built, or the spiritual experience on which religion is based, but to comprehend them in one synoptic view. Of the reality of our experience, whether sensuous or spiritual, it is impossible for anyone who has the experience, that is to say for any experient, to doubt; the experience is simply *there*. That for each kind of experience there is some ground, that for both kinds there is some one ground, could we but state it, we believe. That the kinds are two is, it will perhaps be said, the fact we start from. But the fact is that the experience from which any of us starts is one; to understand and deal with it better we may and do concentrate our attention now on this part of it, and now on that; and, if the parts are really better understood, they will be the more clearly seen to be manifestations of the whole. And it is towards a better understanding of the parts that *Religion and Science* is addressed.

The ordinary, commonsense view, from which Dr. Merz starts, distinguishes between the outer and the inner world, meaning by the former the things and events which lie around us, and by the latter our sensations, feelings, conceptions, ideas, and the like. The reality of both worlds is accepted by Dr. Merz as the basis of his argument, and so too is the distinction between them. But the stand-point from which they may be viewed as the outer and the inner world is not the only point of view from which it is possible to consider our experience. If the reader will give his attention

> "solely to his own experience, he will notice that this consists in a continuous flow of thought which language describes in various terms, such as sensation, perception, ideas, feelings, desires, volitions, &c. There is absolutely nothing else in his mind, and the latter—the mind itself—is at the moment for him nothing less and nothing more than the totality of the many features of this flowing river or stream of thought."

The difference between these two ways of looking at things is that in the first the experient is but a speck infinitesimally and inconceivably small in a world of reality external to him; whereas in the latter not only does everything of which he can be conscious fall within the range or sphere of his consciousness, but his sense experience fills only a small portion of his field of consciousness, and that a portion relatively insignificant when compared with his ideas, feelings, desires, aspirations, and volitions.

These then are the ways in which things may be, and as a matter of fact are, presented to us; in the one—and this is the point of view of science

—we are immersed in and surrounded by things; in the other—and here it is that we must look for Religion—all things fall within the domain of consciousness, and are facts of consciousness. The difficulty of reconciling the two views, and not giving up either, seems to some minds to amount to an impossibility; and it is to that difficulty Dr. Merz addresses himself.

In scientific enquiries it is of the first and fundamental importance that all reference to the enquirer's personal feelings and desires should be dismissed; his notions of what is desirable, or ought to be the case, must be rigidly ruled out—the personal element, or personality, is a disturbance which must be wholly excluded from science. Here then we have the limit, the self-imposed limit of science; for science personality is an obtruder that cannot be suffered to trespass within the bounds of science, that is within the realm of things. That is the view of science; it is built upon experience, and proceeds upon experience, but the existence of an experient it either denies, if it is Materialist, or abstains from taking into account. Valid therefore as the scientific view—and it is undoubtedly valid, for the experience on which it builds is simply and undeniably *there*—it is not exhaustive, it does not go the whole way, for it leaves out of account the experient, without whom no experience of any kind can be. Hence the necessity of turning to the other point of view, from which all that a man is aware of comes within the field of his consciousness, and his personality embraces all his experience and includes all that he is conscious of at any time. This view is just as valid as the scientific view, and it is the wider, for it recognises not only the things which figure in our consciousness, but also the persons who are, like the things in our experience, simply and undeniably *there*. From this point of view, one characteristic of personality is that it is, or strives to be, an all-embracing something. That no human personality does embrace or comprehend the all of existence is just as true as that no scientific system comprehends the whole of possible experience. But that there is a totality of things, and a whole experience, is an implication which becomes manifest on reflection. And experience, complete or incomplete, implies an experient; experience without an experient is a contradiction in terms, just as an experient without experience is an impossible conception.

Thus, from the one point of view, the field of science includes all things and persons; while, from the other, everything that can be experienced is included in the field of consciousness; experience, whatever its range, is impossible without an experient. The All is never in its totality present in the field of consciousness of any imperfect personality; the All of experience implies an all-embracing experient, a perfect personality. Dr. Merz's object is not to deny the validity of the scientific view, but to make it plain that the religious view has just the same validity. It is not the case that the scientific view is the only one that can possibly with reason be taken; the other view is one which we not only may, but actually do take with equal reason—it is from the point of view of an experient that each one of us naturally and necessarily sees his own experience, and it is also from that point of view alone that experience as a whole can be experienced.

With the establishment of this position the object of Dr. Merz's essay on *Religion and Science* is attained; religion and science are not irreconcilable. The content of consciousness Dr. Merz compares to the starry heavens at night—the Firmament of the soul; therein are our sense experiences, apparently fixed points, capable indeed of scientific definition, but far from filling the whole Firmament of the soul, or exhausting the contents of consciousness. In the Firmament of the soul the contents of consciousness are at first simply *there*. We eventually believe them, however, not merely to be there, but also to be in some sense or to some degree real, to be real persons and real things. This belief neither results from, nor can be proved by, any process of inference; it is, in the full sense of the word, Revelation. The Miraculous is either an occurrence which has no parallel in experience, or which does not come under the categories of scientific thought; it occurs, if we may so put it, in the inter-stellar spaces of the Firmament of the soul. Again, from the point of view of science, human beings like material things are found within the All of science; while, from the other point of view, all that can be known must, in order to be known, form the contents of some conscious person. And as we have to conceive the human personality under both these aspects, so it is under both these aspects that we have to endeavour to conceive the Divine Personality; from the one point of view He is immanent in all beings, from the other He transcends all.

This account of Dr. Merz's essay is poverty-stricken indeed when compared with the wealth and the fulness of the many lines of thought with which his 190 pages are filled. Of the balance and beauty with which his sentences are built, and of the limpidity of his language, so translucent that the depth of the thought is not at first sight fully to be estimated, nothing has here been said. If either the thought or its expression are to be enjoyed, the book must be read. The only criticism we have to make of the book is the grateful criticism of wishing there were more of it. And we will give point to the criticism by explaining where it is exactly that we are left asking for more. Throughout the book Dr. Merz is engaged in considering the scientific body of thought, and the contents of consciousness; they stand face to face, each straining to swallow the other. If either succeeded, a reconciliation of a kind would indeed be effected, but to such a consummation Dr. Merz is, from the start and by the very purpose of his book, opposed. Consequently, such a disaster can be averted "only if we let our thought wander from one to the other without trying to unite both aspects in one moment of time." Now, so long as it is with aspects that we concern ourselves, it may be possible to turn our thoughts first to one aspect and then to the other, and it may be impossible to unite both aspects in one moment of time. But man is not only conscious, and he not only thinks, but he acts. To achieve his ends he sets at work causes which will secure the results he desires, or he studies the movements of things, and sets down for future use the predictions he makes, say, in the Nautical Almanack. The chain of causation does not present two aspects, but one alone—that of necessity. Neither does man himself escape from the law of Universal Causation; the Uniformity of Nature includes also the uniformity of human

ature. Persons and things are part and parcel of one and the same system, hose action is one and the same in both things and persons. And the inciple of that action, thus regarded, is mechanical. But when we say hus regarded," we admit that this is only one aspect which the All of ature presents; it is the aspect it bears when viewed—or supposed to be ewed—from the outside. But we who are constituent parts of the whole, now how some of those parts, *viz.*, ourselves, act; and at the moment of tion we feel ourselves to be free, even if subsequently we come to see, or to ppose we see, that the action which we felt to be free, when we performed was but one link in the chain of causation. Thus action—the action of rsons—presents the aspect of freedom.

It seems then at first that when we consider the world of action, Dr. erz's theory of the Two Aspects applies to it as well as to consciousness d its contents. If this be the case, then not only are our actions in one pect free, and in the other necessitated, but the actions of things also, if chanical in one aspect, must be free in the other. And in that case, if edom and unfreedom are but aspects, the essential nature of action is ther free nor unfree. Thus, from a difficulty we escape into a mystery. d it may be said, not only this but all things end in mystery. By ne readers, however, it will be felt that though human action may wear two aspects—of freedom at the moment of action; of necessity, on lsequent reflection—the action of things never exhibits the aspect of edom. If, then, human action is, as we feel at the moment of action, lly free, and the action of things is not, it follows that freedom and freedom are not two aspects of the same action, but that one is the essence personal action, and the other the essence of the action of things. And s our universe is divided against itself, and is no longer one system uated by a single principle; we can only "let our thoughts wander" from one principle of action to the other, without trying to unite the two. on this conclusion the following remarks may be made. The idea that e are two principles of action, one exhibited in the action of persons, the er in the action of things, necessarily presupposes the existence of persons things, that is of an experient and his experience. It further pre-poses that the experient and his experience are separate from one another interact on each other, the former with personal freedom, the latter with hanical action. It proceeds, that is to say, by way of analysis, by way istinguishing and separating the experient and his experience; and then n it endeavours to put together again what it imagines it has divided, it s that the synthesis which it seeks to effect is an impossibility. The ole fact is that an experient and his experience are inseparable; to gine them separated, and to call experients persons, and their experience gs, entails the supposition, with all its difficulties, that they operate on other *ab extra*. Such is the consequence of starting from the patent rdity of supposing that an experient and his experience exist indepen-ly of each other—as though there could be an experient who had no rience, or as if experience could exist without an experient. The rdity is clear when faced; it is but cloaked, when we speak of the facts

of his experience as things, and suppose them independent of experience. The facts of experience cannot be independent of experience, or operate on it from without.

In fine, what we suggest is that the Two Aspects of which Dr. Merz speaks —the Religious and the Scientific—are gained by concentrating attention in the one case on the nature of an experient (though experient is not a word which Dr. Merz uses), in the other on the nature of experience. But to suppose that experient and experience are thus separate in fact is to suppose a contradiction in terms. And it is impossible to bring together again things which have no existence apart. All that can be done is to see, and help others to see, God in the world, and the world in God. But to say that the world wears two aspects, and that we can only let our thoughts wander from one to the other, without trying to unite both aspects in one moment of time, is to substitute two appearances for the one reality. And Dr. Merz is the least likely of philosophers to intend this, for he holds with Plato that the business of the philosopher is to strive to see things synoptically, in their "togetherness." It was Hume who endeavoured to reduce our experience to what he called "loose and separate" impressions.

ANGLO-CATHOLIC FAITH AND PRACTICE.*

Mr. Hardy's handbook has the merit of brushing away side issues, and placing the Roman controversy, which, like the poor, is "always with us," on its real basis—the Papal claims. The popular Roman apologetic, whether dogmatic, or, as is now more generally the case, temperamental, is irrelevant: the point is here. If these claims are valid, submission follows—however convincing the case, *e.g.*, for Anglican Orders; if invalid, it is, or should be, out of the question. The reason why this is not universally recognised, is that secession, in the great majority of cases, is a matter of temperament not of conviction. And there is no arguing with a prepossession. If, to a man of a certain unbalance, England stands for the prose of religion, and Rome for its poetry, to Rome he will go—like Luther to Worms, "though there were as many devils as there are tiles on the roofs."

Sound as Mr. Hardy's main argument is, his *obiter dicta* are remarkable. Of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin—defined by Pius IX., 1854:

> "It is true, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception has not been formally accepted by us; but the language of English Churchmen since the Reformation leaves no room to doubt that such is a legitimate pious opinion among us." (p. 94).

---

* *Catholic, or Roman Catholic?* Twelve Letters to one unsettled in the English Church. By T. J. Hardy, M.A. 1916.

Some Defects in English Religion, and other Sermons. John Neville Figgis, D.D., Litt.D. London: Robert Scott.

Of the Reservation of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper for worship:

"If it has been the Will of our Lord in later times so to reveal Himself to the faithful, let us be thankful that there is nothing in our English Church to disallow the devotion." (p. 92):

And of "the Ornaments of the Church, and of the Ministers thereof":

"I agree with you that to see a Priest officiating at the Altar with a surplice and an academical badge 'gives one a shudder.' (p. 92).

To those unaccustomed to the ἦθος of the "advanced" school it may seem strange that this effect should be produced in an English Churchman by the ceremonial universal among us for 350 years, and still in use in the great majority of our churches. The surplice, if inadequate, is inoffensive; it must be to the "academical badge"—the hood—that the pious shudder is due. A degree—probably, it is to be feared, a Pass degree—indicates a moderate, a very moderate, amount of learning. But the theological college is replacing the public school and the university; and even this modicum is distasteful to the public to which Mr. Hardy appeals. It is a small one. What Archbishop Tait spoke of as "those foolish vestments"[1] give offence to the common sense of Churchmen; and their use, though connived at *propter duritiam cordis*, is a violation of the law.

The most noticeable thing in the book is the "Letter from a returned convert" (p. 116-128), which is of considerable psychological interest. It is not surprising that men of emotional and highly strung temperament should find themselves out of their element in the Roman communion; for though, regarding it from outside, they insist on reading their own romanticism into it, Rome is a very matter of fact place. Professor Kirsopp Lake observes that his experience has been "that the Anglican priest who encourages confession is, as a rule, much inferior in wisdom to the Roman;"[2] and the non-introspective attitude of Mr. X's Roman "director" strikes us as less insanitary than "the deep agitations and tears" which accompanied the ministrations of his Anglican confessor, "dear Father C." With Roman Catholics these "gusts and happy sallies," as they have been called, are wisely discouraged; and the routine element in religion is prominent. The late Monsignor R. H. Benson made his first Anglican confession "in a kind of ecstasy," he tells us; and acted for the first time as a confessor "with a sense of awful and splendid guilt."[3] To the more habituated Roman Catholic the process, though real, is in no sense romantic; it is "the manner of the land" (II. Kings, xvi. 26). There are higher conceptions of religion; but there are also lower; in general the Church aims, and aims wisely at the mean.

The seceder to Rome, as Mr. X. seems soon to have become aware, finds himself in a new climate—social, intellectual, and moral.

"*Urbem quam dicunt Romam, Melibœe, putavi*
Stultus ego huic nostræ similem."

---

[1] *Life of Archbishop Tait*, By the present Archbishop of Canterbury, and Canon Benham. p. 236.

[2] *The Stewardship of Faith*, p. 121.

[3] *Confessions of a Convert*, p. 38-54.

Some of his criticisms are patient of a wider application than that which he gives them.

"I speak deliberately when I say that there is an utter absence of anything like veracity in the quarters of which I write."

Veracity is not a "theological virtue." Dr. Arnold wrote in 1833, the year from which the Oxford Movement is commonly dated, that "at Oxford there is an absolute ἐργασιηριον ὑποκρίσεως, whose activitity is surprising;"[1] as ecclesiasticism increases, veracity declines. A more legitimate cause of disillusionment was the superficial character of Roman unity.

"There is quite as much difference, to say the least as among Anglicans; only the differences are about other things. . . . Then there were most serious differences of opinion between the Ultramontanists and the Traditionalists, who seem to be looking eagerly towards the English Church, and the Modernists, who are everywhere."

I hope that the Modernists are "everywhere;" but, if they are, I imagine that they cultivate the virtue of silence: being of the mind of the philosopher, who, when asked of what religion he was, answered that he was of the religion of all wise men; and, when a curious but indiscreet disciple enquired further what that was, replied, "Wise men never tell." As to the "the Traditionalists, who seem to be looking eagerly towards the Church of England," I have never met, or even heard of, them: and I believe that they exist only in Mr. X's imagination. Roman Catholics have little knowledge of, and less interest in, the Church of England; and do not disguise their contempt for the "advanced" school. The odious system of delation which he describes was rife during the last Pontificate.[2] Benedict XV. is too high minded a man to avail himself of his predecessor's instruments and methods. But Rome is Rome, and England is England. Which one prefers is matter of taste and temperament; but the two are very unlike.

The allusion to the Beda College at Rome (p. 127) is regrettable. Unless it had been substantiated, it ought not to have been made.

Those who appreciate Dr. Figgis' work on his own field will regret that he should have left it, it is to be hoped temporarily, for the narrower ground of religious faction. There are many preachers; there are few historians, nor is the example of the philosopher to be imitated,

"Who, born for the universe, narrowed his mind,
And to party gave up what was meant for mankind!"

The Sermons published under the title of *Some Defects in English Religion* which were preached for the most part in Grosvenor Chapel, are generally thoughtful, and often humorous. But a man of less ability might have written them. And their railing is, for these milder days, exceptional: the preacher recalls the son of Gera of whom we read that "he cursed as he went and threw stones at him, and cast dust" (II. Sam., xvi. 13).

"In Lent we try to pray better, if we are not among those dignified Church officials who employ pagan satirists to throw scorn on Christian prayer." (p. 68).

[1] *Life of Dr. Arnold*. A. P. Stanley, p. 287.
[2] The Pontificate of Pius X. *Quarterly Review*, April, 1917.

"Expensive dignitaries may deprecate too much prayer." (p. 81).

"Owing to men like Father Lowder, Father Dolling, and Father Stanton, our liberals are able to occupy those cathedral dignities from whose secure composure they are able to level sneers at their benefactors." (p. 41).

If this language is used at random, its foolishness makes it ineffective. If with intention, it is neither Christian, nor charitable, nor true. And, in either case, it is in the worst possible taste.

Here and there we come across admissions which, coming from such a quarter, may surprise us. Jesus, *e.g.*,

"was not an organizer. It is doubtful how far it is correct to say that He founded the Church." (p. 86).

And,

"supposing that it were so (*i.e.*, that "our Lord had nothing to do with the origin of the Eucharist"), it would make no difference to the theology or practical value; for the Catholic contention is that our Lord is continuous with the life of the Church." (p. (87).

While, throughout, the popular sympathies of the writer are manifest,

"Yet, even at this moment (August, 1916), people are writing to the papers in frantic dread lest any taint of sympathy with labour should mar the futility of the National Mission." (p. 38).

This "compassion on the multitude" is the most Christian feature of what is called the "Catholic" school.

Perhaps the most striking passage in the book is one on the much discussed—perhaps too much discussed—question of the time-and-place character of the Birth and Resurrection of our Lord:—

"Jesus of Nazareth was a being of such rare quality that Death could not do with Him what it did with every one else. People who find it hard to believe the Resurrection forget this. All through the life of Jesus on earth this fact is evident, unless you are prepared to jettison the Gospel narrative. His being, His "make," not merely spiritual but physical, was finer, rarer, and more mysterious than that of other men. So it was doubtless with our Lady. One difficulty about the Birth story is due to people thinking she was just an average, respectable woman. Mary was of a nature highly uncommon. She was "highly favoured." That was possible to her which would not have been possible to her sisters.

"Long since men have known that our Lord's spiritual nature was unique. Only by a false abstraction do we fail to see that His bodily organization was also unique. We have standardized mankind. Evidence is forthcoming that in the strange borderland between the physical and psychical the human race is subject to even wider differences than those hitherto known." (p. 117).

These suggestive remarks have in view only one aspect of the question in which they bear. But it is an important aspect: and it is one which is seen more clearly from the human side—where we know something, and may hope to know more—than from the Divine, where knowledge fails us.

And an argument, moving on these lines, in favour of the traditional interpretation of the Gospel record, would deserve to be considered with respect.

ALFRED FAWKES.

THE FORSAKEN IDEAL.

That brilliant publicist, Professor Goldwin Smith, wrote:—

"It would be a greater service to humanity on philosophical as well as religious grounds, to contribute the smallest unit towards the Reunion of Christendom, than to construct the most perfect demonstration of the free personality of man."

Canon Grane, in his recent volume, *Church Divisions and Christianity*,* an expansion of his unpublished Hulsean Lectures of 1913, offers an important contribution towards the reunion of Christendom.

On his title-page stands the well-known motto: *In necessariis Unitas, in dubiis Libertas, in omnibus Caritas*, and what is rather less usual, his whole volume is true to the spirit of that motto.

Many who long earnestly for Christian reunion are weary to death of talk about it, especially the sort of talk which tells you how a Roman priest and an Anglican parson and a Baptist minister sat together on the same sofa, or addressed an audience from the same platform. Such social and local amenities, admirable as they are, on the part of ecclesiastics, seem to do little in the matter of reunion. What we want to see are not Romans, Anglicans, and Baptists sitting on the same sofa, but sharing in the same Holy Communion as did the first disciples of the Lord, for that, as our Prayer Book tells us, "is a sign of the love which Christians ought to have among themselves one to another" (Art. XXVIII.).

The arguments in favour of not burning alive our fellow Christians who differ from us in religious beliefs are overwhelmingly strong, yet the authorities of the Church continued to do it through a number of centuries, and we have even heard a canon in our own day from a cathedral pulpit defend the practice. The arguments in favour of Christian reunion are also overwhelmingly strong, but that is no reason in the light of Church History for supposing that our ecclesiastical authorities are going to act upon them for a century or two at least.

We know that Christian unity is a Christian *duty*. We know that Christ prayed that His disciples might be one, even as He and the Father were one. We know that His ideal for His Church as reported by the beloved disciple was "one flock, one shepherd." We know that a divided Christendom is a standing memorial to the world of the un-Christian character of the Christian Church.

We know also that unity is a *necessity* if the Christian Church is to accomplish its mission of winning the world to Christ. Christian divisions and Christian antagonisms render Christendom feeble in the presence of

* *Church Divisions and Christianity*, by Canon W. L. Grane. Macmillans, price 5/- net.

anti-Christian ideals and efforts. A united Christian Church might well have prevented the present War. The guilt therefore of that War lies in part at the door of all the authorities of the Christian Church.

We know also the enormous *waste* of resources and energies which is entailed by our amazing divisions. Years ago the Bishop of Ballarat dealt with this as it affects the Church in our British Dominions beyond the seas, where Church resources are few, and Church needs are many. He said:—

> "What *do* you find in many an Australian township? Five underpaid ministers riding five underfed horses, ministering to five scanty congregations, where one man could do all the work more efficiently."

Yet the undoubted *wrongness*, *weakness*, and *wastefulness* of our un-Christian divisions fail to make us resolve to end them. Why? Because of our lack of love, our lack of truth, our lack of wisdom. There is undoubtedly a strong desire for reunion, but each wants reunion on his own terms, and he declines to have it on any other, and the terms offered by none of the great Christian communions are those of Christ.

It is plain that unity can only be obtained in essentials. The Romanist wishes to keep his dogma of the Papal Infallibility as essential; the member of the Orthodox Greek Church wishes to keep his belief in the Single Procession of the Holy Spirit as essential; the Baptist wishes to keep his practice of baptism of adults by immersion as essential; the Anglican wishes to keep his historic episcopate as essential. Why should they not do so if they feel it is of paramount importance for their religious life, and yet, at the same time, unite in a spirit of Christian fellowship in the Lord's Supper with those who take a different view. We know to-day that Christ did not make Papal Infallibility, the doctrine of the Single Procession, adult Baptism by immersion, the historic episcopate essentials of Christian discipleship. Are we justified in doing so at the cost of Christian unity and fellowship? If we do so, are we not setting our theories and deductions above, not to say in opposition to, our Lord's Teaching, and are we not thereby rendering Christian Unity impossible?

We cannot all believe alike on a variety of theological questions; we cannot all feel alike in regard to a number of ritual and liturgical practices. But why should we? This is not necessary for Christian fellowship and unity. All that is needful for that is the worship of the One Father of All, as revealed by and in the Son; the belief in the presence and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; the resolution to bring forth the fruits of the Spirit in the unity of the one body of Christ. As for unauthorised additions of faith and practice, we must learn to acquiesce in them even where we cannot commend and adopt them. Bishop Fisher said at his execution: "What matter how the head lies, if the heart be right?" This is a hard saying for those who place the purity of the faith or historic uniformity of practice, first. St. Paul, like the Saviour, placed love first, but the natural man declines to do so. But reunion can only be obtained on that basis. But in order to get the Christian communions to adopt that policy three things are needful: a great softening of the Christian heart, a great enlightening of the Christian mind, a great awakening of the Christian conscience.

Canon Grane defines the threefold need thus:—

I.—"Willingness on the part of all organised Christendom to acknowledge error.

II.—"A new understanding of and regard for the most Fundamental Verities.

III.—"A much more absolute allegiance to the Supremacy of Christ." (p. 58).

Canon Grane disposes effectively of two views which commonly militate against Christian unity in the minds of Anglicans:—

I.—"The idea that Anglican discipline requires the barring of adult Christians, quite apart from 'notorious evil-livers,' from participation in the Eucharist, except they be confirmed.

II.—"The idea that Episcopacy was in such a manner instituted at the first as to preclude Churches without Bishops in one of the recognised successions from being accounted Churches at all." (p.154).

For his arguments in support of his conclusions we must refer our readers to his admirable book.

Not until Christians can put first things first, need we expect reunion. Prayers for unity have been said in our churches for many years. Are they worth anything? Canon Grane gives the right answer:—

"Prayer will solve no problems unless the terms of its successful exercise are fulfilled. The charter of Christian prayer runs thus: 'If ye abide in Me, and My words abide in you, ask whatever ye will, and it shall be.' The imposed condition pledges the prayerful to complete co-ordination of their will and desire with the will of God as revealed in Christ." (p. 267).

This is the conclusion of the whole matter. When the Christian Church becomes Christian, we shall have Christian unity, but not before.

H.D.A.M.

THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY*

These Lectures are directed against "the inclination apparent in some recent apologetic to relate the episcopate as we find it in the latter part of the second century with an earlier charismatic ministry, to which there seems to be a thought of serving the episcopate heir." The author, who is a Presbyterian, and a minister of the Church of Scotland, was "startled by certain of the inferences to which the effort to connect the mono-episcopate with this (earlier) hierarchy seemed likely to lead; and yet more by the concessions made in the interest of this connection.' These concessions seemed to him "to involve the collapse of that doctrine of the Holy Ministry which has hitherto been accounted the Catholic doctrine." He does not formulate this "Catholic doctrine" very precisely

* *The Ministry in the Church in relation to Prophecy and Spiritual Gifts (Charismata).*—H. J. Wotherspoon, M.A., D.D. Longmans, 1916. Price 4/6.

While he admits that in its original Tractarian form it was "somewhat rigidly conceived and uncritically developed," his attitude towards the hyphenated Catholicism of Bishop John Wordsworth, Bishop Gore, and Mr. Rawlinson is one of suspicion. "It is evident unto all men diligently reading Holy Scripture and ancient authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been these Orders of Ministers in Christ's Church: Bishops, Priests and Deacons." So the Preface to our Ordinal informs us. Dr. Wotherspoon, if we are not mistaken, would secularize the diaconate; identify the presbyterate, or priesthood, with the episcopate—there is good authority for both positions; and attribute the office of the Presbyter-Bishop to direct Divine institution. And the issue between him and the writers whom he mainly criticizes is not one of the expediency and utility of this ministry, whether here and now, or on the larger field of Church history; but of its claims and origin. Is it, or is it not, *jure divino* and *de esse Ecclesiae?* Is it "from heaven, or of men"?

The former answer is that of mediaeval and modern Roman Catholic theologians. But in the mouth of a non-Roman Catholic it is open to the objection that the doctrine which it embodies is arrested, and stops short of its logical and historical completion in the Papacy. What he defends is not "what has hitherto been accounted the Catholic doctrine," but the decapitated trunk of this doctrine. He finds himself in the dilemma of the modern advocate of clerical celibacy. That patristic and post-primitive Christianity attached a special value to the single state is true. But, for this Christianity, the single state was part of a larger whole—asceticism; a clergyman who took credit to himself for celibacy, but at the same time ate meat, drank wine, and lived the common life of men, would have been regarded as a mere eccentric; asceticism could not be parcelled out in this way. So also the patristic and post-primitive Church accentuated the authority of the episcopate—but as part of a larger system, *i.e.*, the hierarchy. A bishop, whether of the presbyter or the prelate type, separated from the centre of unity embodied, or embodying itself, in the Papacy—it had no place for freaks of this sort. The Sacrament of Orders was a concatenation in a graduated hierarchy: a priest, or bishop, on the loose was a *lusus naturae;* the position would have been considered a contradiction in terms. While the political origin of English episcopacy adds a peculiar difficulty and incongruousness to the naturalization of "the Catholic doctrine" even in a truncated form, in the English Church, "The desire to prove the validity of Anglican Orders to the satisfaction of Roman Catholic critics was a later development of theological controversy," says Professor Pollard;[1] the statesmen who framed the Reformation settlement of religion cut away the sacrificial priesthood root and branch; and retained episcopacy, not as a mysterious vehicle of sacramental grace, but as a time-honoured system of administration to which Englishmen were accustomed, and by means of which the civil power could restrain fanaticism, keeping the turbulent element, never far from the surface of religious movements, in check. When Puritanism developed into Nonconformity, it was found convenient, for controversial purposes, to transfer the claim of the bishop from political to religious ground. Selden notes the danger of the change; and the Commonwealth shewed the justice of his misgivings. "The Pope had as good a title by the law of England as could be had, had he not left that, and claimed by power from God. So may the bishops by this plea of *jure divino* lose all." And—"They are equally mad who say bishops are so *jure divino*

[1] *Political History of England*, vol. vi., p. 216.

that they must be continued; and they who say they are so anti-christian that they must be put away. All is as the State likes."[1]

The most successful of Dr. Wotherspoon's Lectures are those in which he subjects the *Didache* to a criticism, which, if at times overdrawn—it is, *e.g.*, unnecessary and improbable to suppose (p. 49), the itinerant prophet itinerating without intermission; spiritual gifts are occasional, not constant—is on the whole suggestive: the surmise, *e.g.*, of a Montanistic origin for the latter part of that document being indeed "so far only surmise," but having "the advantage of allowing for it a certain background of reality which otherwise it is hard to assign." (p. 58). Editing indeed is the more probable solution; for the substance of the document can scarcely be assigned to a later date than the middle of the second century. And Dr. Wotherspoon seems greatly to overestimate the bearing of the *Didache* on the view of the ministry of the first age which he controverts. This view was held before the discovery of the *Didache;* and is in no way dependent on it. While to speak of it as, "if we may put it so, rediscovered and restated on a philosophical basis" by Sohm, is to put it very much too strongly. Harnack, while admitting that there are few books from which so much can be learned as the famous *Kirchenrecht*, says of Sohm that he has arrived *ex errore per veritatem ad errorem;* and, of the Gospel, that it stands above questions of Church government as of race. "*Es kann sich mit allem verbinden was nicht Sünde ist . . . . warum nicht auch mit dem monarchischen Bischof, mit dem Rechtsbuch der Römer, ja mit dem Papste, wenn diese sich nur nicht in das Evangelium setzen?*"[2]

"This conception of the Church," Dr. Wotherspoon admits, "is logical and concatenated. It covers the ground. It has an intellectual basis; it corresponds to a definite and respectable type of Christian experience, and it is likely always to appeal to one class of mind. It has the merit of elasticity, and may be held more or less thoroughly, and carried out with more or less consistence." This last is no small advantage; for here, as in other subject matter, no formula is adequate to the complexity of nature. It is when he goes on to say that "the difficulty of this theory has been mainly historical," that we part company from him. And when—with a reminiscence of Newman's "suddenly, silently, and without memorial"[3]—he dwells on the rapidity and completeness of this development of the Church in the second century, the answer is that the development in question did but reflect the change of circumstances experienced by the Christian community at that period; and that the wonder would have been, had it not taken place as and when, and to the extent to which it did. Its sufficient reason lies on the surface; the brotherhood had become a World-Church. Organisation, system, professionalizing, followed naturally; their detail was taken, as naturally, from the material that lay to hand. The present writer has attempted elsewhere to describe the process more fully than is here possible.[4] It may be summed up by saying that the *minutiae* over which theologians dispute, are not the things that count in history. The most important events come about silently, unbidden and unforbidden, in virtue of the natural changes incident to human circumstances and life. "Tendency," therefore, in the discussion of Christian origins is superfluous. For the question of origins is secondary. If the episcopal or quasi-episcopal form of Church government could be traced to the Apostolic age, its universal

[1] *Table Talk*, section viii.
[2] *Dogmengeschichte*, i. 39. 305.
[3] *Development of Christian Doctrine*. Ed. 1885, p. 8.
[4] *Studies in Modernism*, chap x. Smith, Elder, & Co., 1913.

obligation would not follow; this would have to be separately established: nor, were its origin later, would this be any argument against its existence to-day. From an early, a very early date, two currents, the inspirational and the institutional, can be traced in Christian literature; the presence of the latter in our "Gospel according to St. Matthew" entitles us to describe this compilation, in view of subsequent history, as the "the most important book ever written."[1] But internal and external evidence combine to shew that the former is the authentic stream, the latter the tributary, whose "sub-introduction" can be accounted for, indicated, and assigned to an, at least, approximate date. *In Tiberim defluxit Orontes:* the pagan waters of a thousand sources have mingled with Jordan's flood.

It has been said of the Papacy, in which what Dr. Wotherspoon calls "the Catholic doctrine of the ministry" culminates, that it is inconceivable that, had it been as central as mediaeval theologians make it, the Scriptural argument for it should have been so weak. The same holds of any theory which makes a particular form of the ministry necessary and invariable. Dr. Wotherspoon's apologetic is candid, moderate, and—a rare thing in apologetic—urbane. But it is unconvincing. It falls back upon preference and prepossessions. "In any account of the Church from its emergence from the Upper Chamber towards its present form as we know it, there are certain things which one would prefer to avoid." Among these are "any way of understanding the past which ascribes to the Church initiative or authority in matters of its essential equipment;" "any account of the Church which should begin with 'Once upon a time'—once God was near—in those days the Church's common day gave effective proof of Heavenly Presence; but not now—that which begins in the supernatural has subsided into the natural;" "the idea of dislocations as incidents in the Church's unfolding" (pp. 76-80). Such preferences are arbitrary; and the terms "essential," "supernatural," "dislocation," are ambiguous. They connote theory; history follows the safer path of events and facts.

The authority of the Pastoral Epistles, as a source, is small. In their present form they can scarcely be earlier than the second decade of the second century; the echo of Marcion in the *ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως* (I. Tim. vi. 20) suggests a later date for certain portions. They are pseudonymous and tendencious; their purpose being "to vindicate the authority of the elders, or bishops, over the enthusiasts and ascetics";[2] while, in the impossibility of reconciling the Acts with the undoubted Pauline Epistles, the evidence of the latter must be accepted—the former presenting a problem not yet solved. The suggestion that the contemporary and first and detail given in the First Epistle to the Corinthians—an epistle which is the master key to the earliest Church history—is "by no means typical" or normal, the Corinthian community being "in a crisis of spiritual excitement" comparable to a modern "revival" (p. 25) is gratuitous; the text gives no reason for supposing that this was so. The Synoptic Gospels, in particular that of Mark, were compiled later than the Pauline Epistles; but they represent an earlier period, and they confirm the account of I. Corinthians; an official ministry is not there. "The Lord is the Spirit" (II. Cor. iii. 17); in this *πνεῦμα-κύριος-Lehre*, as Bousset calls it,[3] the explanation of the various activities of the Christian community is to be found. The ministry, like everything else in the Church, was not a thing

[1] *The Making of the New Testament.* B. W. Bacon. p. 145.
[2] Dr. Moffatt in *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, iv. 5082.
[3] *Kyrios Christos*, p. 145.

become, but a thing becoming; the Christian took no thought for to-morrow because to-day the Lord might come, and this present αἰών be passed away. The stereotyped conceptions of later theology, ritual, canon law, and the like are shattered upon the universal and enthusiastic belief in the imminence of the Parousia. The *Leit-motif* of Apostolic and primitive Christianity is Maran Atha—"The Lord is at hand."

ALFRED FAWKES.

GOD'S PROGRESSIVE REVELATIONS OF HIMSELF TO MAN.*

It is a welcome sign of the times that the S.P.C.K. is unable to resist the tide of Modernism. No doubt the honoured name of Canon J. M. Wilson of Worcester, would help to dispel any misgivings that the editorial committee might have felt if this modernist theme had been handled by a lesser man. At any rate we may thank the S.P.C.K. for publishing Dr. Wilson's seven sermons, which will serve as a very useful introduction to the elements of a moderate and cautious form of Modernism. The first sermon strikes the key-note of the book: "Our conceptions of God ought to be constantly growing. They cannot, therefore, be expressed in any final form." Hence the danger of trying to define the indefinable. The passion for 'definite Church teaching,' may indeed be nothing higher than a subtle modern form of idolatry.

Speaking of God in creation, Canon Wilson warns teachers that to give children crude notions may cause a fatal perplexity in later life. "Is there not," he concludes, "with us of the Church of England, a real danger that our own standards of truthfulness of thought, of social justice and righteousness, are being outgrown and surpassed by the rising standards of justice, humanity, and love of truth among those around us, whom, alas, we can scarcely call our own?"

C. MOXON.

CHURCHMEN'S UNION NEWS.

Surrey Branch.—Members of this branch met on March 27th in St. Michael's Crypt to listen to an address from Mr. Wells Thatcher, barrister-at-law, on "The Church and Women." In his opening remarks he spoke of the many new positions women now occupy efficiently. Passing on from a review of the uses made in these days of women, he said he was sorry that the Church had not taken full advantage of her services. There was a theory that tradition was all against her taking a prominent

* By J. M. Wilson, D.D., Canon of Worcester. S.P.C.K.

part in religious services. He thought this a mistaken view. In the earliest chronicles he found references to Miriam, Deborah, Huldah, and Anna, all of whom had exercised some spiritual function. Coming to more recent times, Mr. Thatcher called attention to the great powers of abbesses. The Abbess of Whitby, St. Hilda, not only ruled over men and women, but also presided at a Synod of the Church, at which important decisions were reached. If there had been women in the past capable of holding such important positions, he felt that there must be many now whose public service would be of great advantage to the Church. They had done the humbler work for many years; he felt there was no reason why they should not occupy more exalted places in the Church. He looked forward with confidence to the refining influences women would have in the sphere of politics, and he thought she might have a quickening influence in the sphere of religion. A discussion followed.

South Essex Branch.—The sixth meeting of the South Essex branch was held on Saturday, April 21st, at 3-15, at the Chaplaincy, Hornchurch, by the kind invitation of the Rev. Herbert and Mrs. Dale. The branch was honoured on this occasion by a visit from the Rev. Hubert Handley, who, in his usual inspiring manner, gave a short account of the three great Movements in the Modern English Church—"the Evangelical Revival of the Eighteenth Century, the Catholic Revival of the Nineteenth, and the Liberal Movement, the saving Movement of the Twentieth Century."

The object of Modernism is to help the Church to avoid expressing religion in obsolete and dying ways, to abandon misleading interpretations of Scripture, to help men to get into a sane relation with the Eternal. We must be ready to speak, as Wesley did, "the Great Word." Our minds must be on the alert for what is good in other systems of religious thought; instead of adopting a thin, scowling, hostile attitude, we must assimilate what is valid; we must be in sympathy with the throbbing life of England.

The Liberal Movement is the Movement of hope, of life, of reconciliation. It is worth working for, praying for, and, if need be, suffering for.

Manuals' Fund.—Since the issue of the April issue the Hon. Treasurer reports the following additional subscriptions to the Manuals' Fund:—Dr. W. F. Clarke (Toronto), £5; Rev. C. G. Acworth (Westerham), £5; Rev. Dr. Morrison, £2 10s.; Rev. W. Fairlie Clarke, £2; Rev. Dr. Rendall, £1; Rev. C. I. Radford, C.F., 10/-; Rev. A. M. Coleman, 5/-; Rev. H. Handley, 2/6; Miss Mary Anderson (Ilkley), 2/6; Miss Munday (Saffron Walden), 2/6; Harold F. Walker, 7/6. Total to date, £233 12s.

CORRESPONDENCE.

HOW TO CURE CLERICAL PROFESSIONALISM.

Sir, To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman.*

In your January number two complaints are expressed—complaints often felt—as regards the training of the clergy (1) that it produces professionalism; (2) that the teaching given at theological colleges is far from satisfactory. If these be true, is not the remedy simple and direct? Suppose that the training ceases to be chiefly academic; and that, looking to the time when they must be all things to all men, and that in the truest fellowship—a period should be included in it—in which they should in practical reality "learn life." St. Paul, and a greater than he, worked at a trade before beginning their ministry. Why should not ordinands do the same? The scheme that suggests itself is this: allow them, as at present, to have their public school life and their three years at the university. So most naturally and normally will they get into touch with the professional and well-to-do young men who will form a portion of those to whom later they are to minister; but at that point, instead of going at once to a theological college, let them for three to five years do the work of an artisan—choosing any for which they may happen to have preference or aptitude—but living the artisan's life in artisan dwellings, with the weekly wage, subject to the vicissitudes of that life with no possibility of falling back on other resources (that condition is of course imperative) and associating with their fellow workers on a footing of absolute equality. The difference between this life and work even of the most devoted character, needs no elaboration. Then at the close of that period would come one or perhaps two years at a theological college.

Such a scheme thoroughly carried out would (1) make professionalism a thing of the past. The man has lived on an intensely human footing. The experience could not be forgotten; (2) such an experience would result in a demand for a very real and living theology, and the demand once imperative would have to be met.

Difficulties, of course, at once suggest themselves; two perhaps only need be mentioned.

The training will be long, and the age of ordination necessarily postponed. Would that, however, be a disadvantage? (incidentally may it here be noticed that the years of hard living might afford just that test of vocation which is felt to be so essential, and yet so difficult adequately to supply).

(2) There is the question of marriage. That, too, might have to be postponed. But do many professional men marry before the age of twenty-eight or twenty-nine? There is too the possible alternative that the girl might have vocation, and might welcome an experience, which would bring her into a sympathy with her sisters, unobtainable to such a degree in any other way. In that case it does not seem entirely beyond the wit of man to devise some scheme of non-residential attendance at theological lectures.

The discussion of this, however, requires expert knowledge, and so cannot be really touched upon here.

The main point one desires to make is this—that until our priests have some such real experience, it is almost hopeless to expect that they should be able to get into sincere relations with labour or free themselves from the caste limitations which at present so hamper their work.

MARY MORSHEAD.

"QUOD EST BENEDICTA OMNIUM FIDELIUM ECCLESIA."

SIR, *To the Editor of* THE MODERN CHURCHMAN.

History repeats itself. On December 10th, 1916, the Rev. John Gamble, Vicar of St. Mary's, Leigh Woods, Bristol, preached, with the consent of the Bishop of Bath and Wells, and of the Bishop of Bristol, at Highbury Congregational Chapel, Bristol. On March 25th, 1917, the Very Rev. Dr. Henson, Dean of Durham, preached twice at the City Temple, London.

Apropos of the above brace of Christian Fellowship and Brotherhood instances, I am proud to give a very interesting incident connected with a a Catholic-minded and Christian-hearted predecessor of mine, the Rev. Rowland Ingram. I must first explain that at that period the Evening Prayers were said in Giggleswick-in-Craven Church in the afternoon, and that Zion Independent Chapel, Settle (one of the four daughter ecclesiastical districts of the ancient Parish of Giggleswick-in-Craven), was without a regular resident pastor. For six months, every Sunday evening, Vicar Rowland Ingram, with the sanction of his father in God, the Right Rev. Dr. Bickersteth, Bishop of Ripon, and with the consent of the Incumbent of Settle, the Rev. W. F. Pierson, conducted Divine service in Settle Independent Chapel. I append an extract from the *Settle Chronicle and North Ribblesdale Advertiser* of November 1st, 1854. *Res loquitur ipsa.*

> "On Sunday evening, 27th, the Rev. R. Ingram, late Vicar of Giggleswick-in-Craven, conducted divine service in the Independent Chapel, Settle. During the previous week it had been whispered about that the reverend gentleman intended to do so, and by six o'clock great numbers were seen wending their way towards the Chapel, and by half-past, the time for beginning, the Chapel was crowded in every part, pews, gallery, and aisles. Several had to return unable to obtain room. Exactly at the time the reverend gentleman ascended the pulpit dressed in the surplice, and commenced the evening service of the Church of England, Mr. John Hardacre being clerk, in the clerk's desk. The service was listened to with deep attention and great decorum, notwithstanding the crowded state of the Chapel, which must have been to many very uncomfortable. At the close of the evening service the clerk gave out a psalm from Dr. Watt's collection, which was joined in heartily by the whole congregation, and towards the close of the singing the reverend preacher ascended the pulpit in his gown, which he had substituted for the surplice, and delivered an interesting and eloquent discourse from the 87th Psalm, verse 3. 'Glorious

things are spoken of thee, O city of God.' He commenced by stating the glorious things which had been said about Jerusalem during the existence of Solomon's Temple, and that in consequence of the idolatry of the Jews, the Almighty had permitted it to be destroyed, and themselves taken into captivity, but on their repentance the Temple had been again rebuilt, and more glorious things had been spoken of it, as it was to be visited with the presence of Him who came to save the world. It was again destroyed owing to the wickedness of the people, which this time consisted not in the sin of idolatry but of the sins of pride, covetousness, revenge, &c., that the Saviour of the world had erected on earth a Spiritual Temple, which comprised all true believers on earth. After making very solemn appeals to his audience as he went on, he came to the appointment by our Lord of a ministry who were to continue to the end of the world, to proclaim the glorious things of the city of God which were still to be spoken to the people. He believed that there was no dispute amongst any of the sects or bodies of Christians, about there being a divinely appointed ministry. He was one of Christ's ministers, and with the sanction of the Bishop, his spiritual ruler in Christ, and the sanction of the Incumbent of Settle, he appeared there that evening. The friends had been most kind in their offer of the Chapel. They had freely given him permission, and he freely undertook to preach the word of God. He differed with them on many important points, but on very many important points he cordially agreed with them. He was glad to see so large a congregation assembled, no doubt many of them had come out of curiosity. He blamed them not, but he hoped all who were in the habit of regularly attending a place of worship would still continue to do so, as he was not desirous of withdrawing any from their usual places of worship. He came there to seek the lost sheep, and he hoped he might be able to direct some to the salvation of the Lord Jesus Christ. The doxology was then sung, and the service concluded. The effect upon the congregation at the Church was very perceptible, but it was marked in the Chapels. There were great numbers present who are seldom seen in either Church or Chapel."

An extract from the Holy Communion Office stands at the head of this letter. I close it with an excerpt from the Bidding Prayer:—"Ye shall pray for Christ's holy, Catholic Church, that is, for the whole congregation of Christian people dispersed throughout the whole world."

THEODORE P. BROCKLEHURST,
B.E.F., France. *Vicar of Giggleswick.*

CORRIGENDUM.

The last line on p. 34 in Vol. VII., No. 1, ought to be the second line on p. 38.